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The Potentially Prodigious Snowball:
Interpreting GBC Strategy

With the Gulf Oil Corporation, the Congregation for Reconciliation for the first time engaged an opponent with potential to affect resources dear to its members. In that sense, the conflict model developed in chapter 5 more closely parallels that of a war game. The power relationship clearly favors Gulf. Although the tactic might have attracted a great deal of unfavorable publicity and thus have been counterproductive, Gulf could have sued the

members of the Congregation who voted to support the boycott. A defamation-of-character suit by Gulf at this point, however, would catapult the Coalition into unimaginable national prominence. The Coalition has had two years to build alliances with journalists and national organizations which would promptly pounce upon such a controversy, leaving Gulf in an awkward and embarrassing public relations posture.

The power of the Gulf Boycott Coalition to affect valued resources of the corporation such as sale of products remains speculative. Damage to the public image of Gulf, rather than actual loss of sales, may be a more realistic measure of attrition.

Interaction and sentiment become vague concepts in this conflict. Nonconfrontation tactics have minimized direct interaction between the parties considerably, although behind the scenes contact with some Gulf public relations personnel-who have the unhappy task of undoing Coalition damage to Gulf's image-has remained constant. Assessment of sentiment is impossible.

The only cost to Gulf thus far has been the growing annoyance provided by the Coalition. Public relations personnel have appeared before several student groups in the past year and have required an increasing number of briefings from management in order to counter pointed questions. This demand upon management resources could become a major annoyance with time, putting Gulf on the defensive and ultimately stimulating internal consideration of alternative policy. Should alternatives be seriously entertained by management, the Coalition has shrewdly provided an opportunity for face-saving. The GBC has never insisted that Gulf withdraw from Angola. Rather, it has placed emphasis upon another option. The Coalition has argued that Gulf can satisfy its demands by "saving" the Cabinda oil-that is, by severely cutting back production until after Angola has become self-governing. In the long run, this would facilitate image cleaning without actual investment loss for Gulf.

On Gulf's side currently is the national attention focused upon "the energy crisis." Public sentiment is now unlikely to support the suspension of any important source of petroleum for whatever moral reason. On the other hand, stories are filtering through to the Western press concerning My Lai type actions of Portuguese troops in Mozambique. Portuguese colonialism may thus receive

increasing public attention as the guerrilla war continues. The American experience in Vietnam combined with the appeal of a war for national independence will probably lead American public opinion to oppose Portugal in the struggle. It is predictable that the Coalition will do what it can to fan the flames of public reaction. As Watergate resolves itself, Portuguese colonialism may receive far greater media attention in the years ahead.

Should this happen, the Gulf Boycott Coalition will reap the benefits of public sentiment. Further, they will make every effort to link Gulf symbolically with the image of a cruel and oppressive colonial regime, thus creating a public relations nightmare. Should this happen, Gulf may "save" the 3.9 percent of total petroleum output derived from the Cabinda field rather than suffer through the public relations contortions and accompanying management headaches produced by such a situation.

The Gulf Boycott Coalition would undoubtedly interpret this as a major victory and claim the credit. The outcome of the boycott, therefore, depends more on how Portugal's colonial war evolves than it does on Gulf. In this sense, time is on the side of the Coalition. Obviously, a major "victory" over Gulf would strengthen the perceived power of the Congregation for Reconciliation in future social-action projects.